Paul Collier
Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places
LSE Lecture Notes
The Bottom Billion was about poverty, looking at the poverty problem differently; 60 countries, with about a billion people, have diverged from the rest of the world, and we need to, as a result, rethink poverty in addressing these people
Paraphrasing Collier:
Wars, Guns, and Votes is about power. Weaknesses, insecurity, and the abuse of political power in these nations. The book starts with the proposition that the international community is in a phase of denying reality. We then need to face reality, in order to effectively change reality. The purpose of the book is getting realistic strategies for change.
“The countries in the bottom billion are in the paradoxical situation of being too large to be nations, but too small to be states.”
The states that we see in Europe emerged as solutions to problems. The boundaries are not intrinsic, they are solutions to problems, the biggest of these being security. Going back in history, proto-states existed in Europe, were tiny, and ruled by thugs. There was then an arms race by these thugs to get the bigger army, in order to expand against their neighbors. The bigger militarized states swallowed up the smaller, and these states were able to provide internal and external security, as a result. This resolution also solves the problems of nationalism, or forging a common sense of national identity, which has been forged so well in Europe, this myth of common identity, as well as the problem of building accountable states. The ones who can spend most on the military as the ones who won the arms race, and these were the ones who were able to build the best taxation to fund their armies, and thus, a degree of good governance as a result, as their taxation relied on the citizens of their states. Thus, the result of the militaristic conquests by early European states is good governance, accountability, and security.
In the bottom billion, the situation was completely different. They were suddenly colonized and broken up into colonial groupings that were split and split and split again into 54 countries, usually very small. These little countries are too large to be nations because there is no process for building a common sense of identity; there is no equivalent to the warfare in Europe that build nationalism; as a result, there is a weak sense of national identity, but a strong sense of sub-national, normally ethnic, identity. This brings a lack of compliance in providing public goods as a result. National identity brings the delivery of public goods. And yet, too small to be states. Looking at where size matters, economic activity is what needs to be measured, and the typical African nation of the bottom billion is tiny. They cannot reap the scale economies that are intrinsic to effective public goods. Thus, supply is inadequate in the provision of public goods, most especially being security and accountability, is sorely lacking.
Looking at the standard public good of defense, providing against external and internal threats, normally internal threats in Africa, as a result of the geo-political consequences of non-interference and sovereignty. Internal insecurity is the biggest issue with these states; the level of the public good of security is not high enough to maintain internal peace. Rebellion is quite rampant and easy in these nations as a result of low income, low growth, dependence on primary commodities, and small economic size-these are all structural features of the bottom billion. If rebellion is so easy, the dilemma is how to secure the state, as the other challenge to the state is from the coup de etat. So, they need a strong military to defend from rebellion, but a weak military to defend from a coup. See: Mobutu’s Zaire-he emasculated his army completely to lessen the feared risk of a coup; as a result, when a tiny rebel group from Rwanda invaded the country and took power in a rebellion. This is a dilemma that leads to no effective way to provide for security in these nations. The risk of conflict is a major deterrent to private investment, and also spill over, cost-wise, to the neighborhood.
Looking at the public supply of accountability, which is not the textbook public good like security, we face another dilemma. First, we need to look at the false goal of the China Model in this argument, as they lack accountability and have grown dramatically; to address this issue, there is a huge dispersion in the success of this model; China is very big, relatively, but also very cohesive, with a strong sense of national identity; thus, there is not a massive divergence in terms of goals between the elite and the masses-both want a strong China; however, in other fractured bottom billion nations, there is a huge gulf in these interests between the autocratic elite and the masses, which is seen again and again. Thus, democracy and accountability is not necessary for China, but it is for the small, fractured nations of the bottom billion.
Accountability comes from the government providing the institutions, and citizens having the freedom to make these work, and also citizens being provoked to scrutinize accountability. The provocation in Europe was taxation and representation; in the bottom billion, taxation is low because of aid and resource rents; the institution that has been promoted in the last 15 years has been elections. Elections force the government to improve economic policies. But only if the elections are properly conducted. Where elections are not properly held, there is, at best, no effect on economic policy, and usually a worsening of economic conditions, as a result.
Bribery, intimidation, and ballot fraud are the three tactics that boost incumbents in elections. In elections that are not properly conducted, the incumbent is only worrying about how long they can stay in office, and they rely on these three variables to both increase their terms and get them off the hook for providing good economic management. If there is a valid election, good economic performance adds to the chances that you will be re-elected. If you resort to bribery and corruption, good economic governance is actually a hindrance to your power consolidation.
Small states are much more prone to these problems-power is very easily personalized in these small societies; in larger societies, you need to quickly institutionalize power. Personalized power often goes very wrong. Poor, small, and dependent on natural elections are the biggest three features that drive crooked elections. These are all features of the bottom billion.
What is to be done?
Above a certain threshold, democracy makes a society safer (2500$). Below that threshold, it makes the society more dangerous. If nations democratize below this level, they still have security issues.
Regional solutions to public supply deficits: spillover is great to neighborhoods from conflict, so it makes sense to pool resources; however, neighbors have illegitimate interests in this issue, such as with Ethiopia trying to bring security to Somalia. The dilemma for the regional supply is the only countries with a real interest in supplying security are often debarred. In terms of regional accountability solutions, efforts have not been impressive (look at Zimbabwe). The Presidents of the bottom billion are sovereignty-retentive and are not willing to share sovereignty. Look at successful models such as the USA, in which states learned to share sovereignty, or the EU. Bottom billion nations need shared sovereignty much more than developed entities such as Germany and California, but they refuse to budge on this issue. In these nations, power is massively centralized in the Presidency, and they will not share this power.
International Solutions to public supply deficits: Why should there be “African solutions to African problems?” They are living in entities that cannot solve the problem of public good supply, and we are. This is not colonialism, mark two. The international supply means: Security-post conflict peace keeping-this is effective-these environments are very risky (40% chance of recidivism); peacekeepers are needed for the first decade to bring the risks down for relapse. It is expensive, but much more cost effective than the cost of conflict. Peacekeeping is a good use of international resources, and is a good value for the money; however, we do not look at it in this light. Aid is looked at as good value, but not peacekeeping. Peacekeeping expenditures should be included in the envelope of overall development. Accountability should be looked at through the prism of money. However, the accountability of governments to their own citizens is what is the problem. Providing money without questions creates problems with corruption through capture; it is empowering the very people who are driving the bottom billion into the ground. Independent verification of budget systems warranting budget support needs to be implemented; in countries that are not fit for budget support, it is irresponsible to provide this support. There needs to be capacity building support to bring these economies up to speed for budget support.
Illicit conduct in elections: how can we make accountability to citizens effective by discouraging cheating in elections? Aid is not sufficient to make Presidents want to cut short their terms. What are Presidents really scared about? Coups. In Africa there has been over 90 coups. They are condemned by the International Community, but we do nothing. So, what can we do? These militaries are relatively feeble, and these coups can be put down relatively easily. This should be offered to democratically elected governments. Any government that undertakes a democratic election should be given a warranty against coups. This would make the cost too high to the internal militaries. This carrot inadvertently turns into a very large stick; suppose a President cheats in an election; when the international community scrutinizes the election, and the president cheats, the guarantee against coups is repealed; this is an invitation to Presidents not to steal elections out of fear of coups, as an inadvertent result.
Look at Senegal: the President-for-life had huge support in the rural areas, and the opposition in the urban areas. When the results came in, the opposition started to pull ahead; then, the President accepted defeat even before the results were counted in the rural areas. A few months earlier there had been a coup in Ivory Coast that was not put down by the French, and this scared the Senegalese President, as the army came in and told him that if he stole the election, they would hold a coup. The President had the option of stepping down honorably, or being displaced in a coup. This is the power of the threat of a coup and shows the value of this warranty.
