Some important notes and commentary from the "Civil War and Postconflict" section of Paul Collier's The Bottom Billion:
"Dependence upon primary commodity exports-oil, diamonds, and the like-substantially increases the risk of civil war." (21)
"A typical low-income country faces a risk of civil war of about 14 percent in any five-year period." (20)
"Take the repression of political rights...There is basically no relationship between political repression and the risk of civil war." (23) To which I would love to ask Professor Collier, how has this changed with the Arab Spring, which obviously proved that there is a connection here, ie: Libya, Yemen, and with the greatest example being Syria (and to a lesser extent the events of the failed Iranian uprising of a few years ago and the recent events in Uganda and Malawi).
"The experience of having been through a civil war roughly doubles the chance of another conflict." (27)
"Civil war is development in reverse." (27)
"The risk that a country in the bottom billion falls into civil war in a five year period is nearly one in six, the same risk facing a player of Russian roulette...growth directly helps to reduce risk; cumulatively it raises the level of income, which also reduces risk, and that in turn helps to diversify the country's exports away from primary commodities, which further reduces risk." (32) To which I would add, in order to prevent the stalling of this cycle of development at the raising of the levels of income (ie: stalling at the diversification level of the economy, which is the true state of affairs in most resource-rich countries, ala: Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, etc), a truly benevolent, people-focused government must be in place (either democratic or not, in my mind and experience, there is no bearing or necessary correlation between open democracy and strong development, ala: the Rwandan/Chinese model of growth), and this government must be willing to invest the necessary inputs into freeing the citizens at the lowest level of society from the bonds of historical repression, ie: illiteracy, malnutrition, etc. Growth is important, obviously, as previously stated, however, key to this growth is a systematic, solidified investment in a populace.
"A country such as The Democratic Republic of Congo will need around half a century of peace at its present rate of growth simply to get back to the income level it had in 1960. Its chances of getting 50 years of continuous peace with its low income, slow growth, dependence upon primary commodities, and history of conflict, are unfortunately, not high. This country is likely to be stuck in a conflict trap no matter how many times it rebrands itself, unless we do something about it." (34). The stark realities, the realism of the challenges facing the very poorest in the world, the most unstable; the realities shared with so many other countries on the ground; and even with massive western intervention, vis-a-vis Afghanistan, the realities are uncertain, at best.
"Dependence upon primary commodity exports-oil, diamonds, and the like-substantially increases the risk of civil war." (21)
"A typical low-income country faces a risk of civil war of about 14 percent in any five-year period." (20)
"Take the repression of political rights...There is basically no relationship between political repression and the risk of civil war." (23) To which I would love to ask Professor Collier, how has this changed with the Arab Spring, which obviously proved that there is a connection here, ie: Libya, Yemen, and with the greatest example being Syria (and to a lesser extent the events of the failed Iranian uprising of a few years ago and the recent events in Uganda and Malawi).
"The experience of having been through a civil war roughly doubles the chance of another conflict." (27)
"Civil war is development in reverse." (27)
"The risk that a country in the bottom billion falls into civil war in a five year period is nearly one in six, the same risk facing a player of Russian roulette...growth directly helps to reduce risk; cumulatively it raises the level of income, which also reduces risk, and that in turn helps to diversify the country's exports away from primary commodities, which further reduces risk." (32) To which I would add, in order to prevent the stalling of this cycle of development at the raising of the levels of income (ie: stalling at the diversification level of the economy, which is the true state of affairs in most resource-rich countries, ala: Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, etc), a truly benevolent, people-focused government must be in place (either democratic or not, in my mind and experience, there is no bearing or necessary correlation between open democracy and strong development, ala: the Rwandan/Chinese model of growth), and this government must be willing to invest the necessary inputs into freeing the citizens at the lowest level of society from the bonds of historical repression, ie: illiteracy, malnutrition, etc. Growth is important, obviously, as previously stated, however, key to this growth is a systematic, solidified investment in a populace.
"A country such as The Democratic Republic of Congo will need around half a century of peace at its present rate of growth simply to get back to the income level it had in 1960. Its chances of getting 50 years of continuous peace with its low income, slow growth, dependence upon primary commodities, and history of conflict, are unfortunately, not high. This country is likely to be stuck in a conflict trap no matter how many times it rebrands itself, unless we do something about it." (34). The stark realities, the realism of the challenges facing the very poorest in the world, the most unstable; the realities shared with so many other countries on the ground; and even with massive western intervention, vis-a-vis Afghanistan, the realities are uncertain, at best.
